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Pay as you go + Autonomy = Market
? Not your father’s Internet 
? Tenants make resource acquisition/control 
decisions and have no incentive to optimize 
for, or be fair/friendly to others
? Infrastructure owners have no incentive to 
minimize cost for tenants 
? Net neutrality implies no policing 
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? Holistic system (social) view is passé
? Challenge is to design the right mechanisms 
that enable an efficient marketplace
Resource Packing Problems
? Spatial Packing (where)
? Bin Packing
? Load Balancing
? Multiprocessor scheduling
? Temporal Packing (when)
? Statistical Multiplexing
? Real Time Scheduling
Resource Instances
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-
? Traffic Shaping
? Spatio-Temporal Packing (both)
Time
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Talk overview: Two settings
Cloud resource acquisition 
? Colocation Games
A spatial packing game
Shared bandwidth arbitration
? Trade & Cap
l k
Resource Instances
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A tempora  pac ing game
Time
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2Spatial Packing: Network Embedding
Host
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http://csr.bu.edu/netembed
Task
Motivation: IaaS pricing 
“Pricing is per instance-hour 
consumed for each instance type. 
Partial instance-hours consumed 
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are billed as full hours.”
(Cloud) Colocation Games
? IaaS cloud providers offer fixed-sized 
instances for a fixed price
? Provider’s profit = number of instances 
sold; no incentive to colocate customers
? Virtualization enables colocation to 
reduce costs without QoS compromises
? C t ’ lfi h  d  th  
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us omers se s ness re uces e
colocation process to a strategic game
Colocation Games
08:00 am / Amazon ? $3 09:00 am / Amazon ? $3
Tasks
10:00 am / Amazon ? $2 11:00 am / Amazon ? $2
Hosts
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3Colocation Games: Questions
? Does it reach equilibrium?
? If so  how fast? ,
? If so, at what price (of anarchy)?
? How about multi-resource jobs/hosts?
? How about multi-job tasks?
? How about job/host dependencies?
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? How could it be implemented?
? How would it perform in practice?
How do we depart from prior work?
? Vickrey-style auctions work†
? Assumes supply < demand 
? Takes a social perspective 
? Offers a strategy-proof solution
? Requires central authority
? Susceptible to collusion
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† A. Young, B. Chun, A. Snoeren, and A. Vahdat. Resource allocation in federated
distributed computing infrastructures. In OS/architectural support for on-demand IT
infrastructure, 2004.
How do we depart from prior work?
? Cooperative cost-sharing games†‡#
? Find coalition where nobody gains by leaving
? Computationally hard
? Applied to best-effort routing problems
? Player cost not use based; unjustifiable 
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† V. Misra, S. Ioannidis, A. Chaintreau, and L. Massoulié. Incentivizing Peer-Assisted
Services: A Fluid Shapley Value Approach. In SIGMETRICS 2010.
‡ H. Chen and T. Roughgarden, T. Network design with weighted players. In SPAA 2006. 
# E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, T. Wexler, and T. Roughgarden.
The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation. In FOCS 2004.
Colocation Game: Model 
? A hosting graph G =(V,E)
? V & E labeled by capacity vector R and fixed price P
? A set of task graphs Ti =(Vi,Ei)
? Vi & Ei labeled by a utilization vector W
? Valid mappings
? Vi ? V & Ei ? E: Σ W ≤ R ; supply meets demand
? Shapley Cost function
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? Cost P of a resource is split among tasks mapped to 
it in proportion to use
4The General Colocation Game (GCG)
? GCG is a pure strategies game: 
Each task is able to make a (better response) 
“move” from a valid mapping M into another M′ 
so as to minimize its own cost
? Example applications:
? Overlay reservation, e.g., on PlanetLab
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? CDN colocation, e.g., on CloudFront
General Colocation Game: Properties 
? GCG may not converge to 
a Nash equilibrium
? Theorem: 
Determining whether a GCG has a 
Nash Equilibrium is NP-Complete 
(by reduction to 3-SAT problem)
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? Need more structure to 
ensure convergence
Colocation Games: Variants
? Process Colocation Game (PCG):
Task graph consists of a single vertex representing 
an independent process that needs to be assigned 
to a single host with only one capacitated resource
? Multidimensional PCG (MPCG):
Same as PCG but with multi capacitated resources
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? Example applications:
? VM colocation, e.g., on a Eucalyptus cluster
? Streaming server colocation
Colocation Games: Variants
? Parallel PCG (PPCG):
Task graph consists of a set of disconnected 
vertices (independent processes), each with 
multidimensional resource utilization needs
? Uniform PPCG:
Same as PPCG but with identical resource 
utilization for all processes
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? Example applications:
? Map-Reduce paradigm
? MPI scientific computing paradigm
5Colocation Games: Theoretical results
? PCG converges to a Nash Equilibrium under 
better-response dynamics
? PCG converges to a Nash Equilibrium in O(n2)
better-response moves, where n = |V| 
? Price of Anarchy for PCG is 3/2 when hosting 
graph is homogeneous and 2 otherwise
? MPCG converges to a Nash equilibrium under 
better response dynamics
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-
? Uniform PPCG converges to a Nash equilibrium 
under better-response dynamics
? …
PCG: Better Response
Best-Response moves require knowledge of 
utilizations of all processes – not practical 
Local Better-Response solution:
1. Select a random target hosting node and obtain process 
utilizations of all processes on that node
2. Determine if a cost-reducing “legal” move to that node is 
possible – an NP-hard Knapsack problem 
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? Dynamic Programming solution in pseudo-polynomial time 
for small number (100s) of processes/host [DPKP] 
? Breadth-First branch & bound Search heuristic [BFS] 
? Depth-First branch & bound Search heuristic [DFS] 
PCG: Performance Evaluation
Workloads
? Trace-driven: CoMon PlanetLab traces
? Real hosting environment with 3-dimensional resource utilizations
? Infeasible to compute optimal colocation
? Synthetic
? Allows systematic exploration of the space
? Optimal colocation is known by construction
Metrics (over 100 experiments)
June 22, 2010 Network and Cloud Resource Packing Games @ TU Berlin 19
? Colocation Ratio (bounded by PoA)
? How inefficient is the resulting colocation compared to optimal or best? 
? Number of moves (not migrations) until NE is reached
? How much churn (overhead) to be expected?
PCG: Synthetic baseline results
Median(Colocation Ratio) Median(Number of Moves)
1-D Synthetic Workload
PoA    
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Number of processes Number of processes
6MPCG: PlanetLab baseline results
Median(Colocation Ratio) Median(Number of Moves)
3-D PlanetLab Workload
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Number of processes Number of processes
MPCG: Colocation Ratio
Median(Worst/Optimal) Median(Worst/Best)
3-D Synthetic Workload 3-D PlanetLab Workload
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Number of processes Number of processes
MPCG: Number of Moves
Median(Number of Moves) Median(Number of Moves)
3-D Synthetic Workload 3-D PlanetLab Workload
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Number of processes Number of processes
The CLOUDCOMMONS prototype
? API for Strategic Services
To facilitate colocation, e.g., allow users to find 
each other,  compute strategic responses, …
? API for Operational Services
To enforce outcomes of colocation, e.g., 
migration, reconfiguration, accounting, …
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? Implemented over Xen (XCS)
7CLOUDCOMMONS: Architecture
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CLOUDCOMMONS: Migration Service
? Identify VMs to migrate
? Minimize number of migrations
? Minimize amount of data that needs to move
? Determine migration plan
? Exploit potential for parallelism
? Minimize need for staging hosts
? E l t  i t f i ti
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va ua e mpac o m gra on
? On performance of the migrating VMs
? On performance of non-migrating VMs
Need for staging hosts
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A temporary (staging) host is needed to swap VM2 and VM4
Need for a migration plan
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8Data/User Transfer Minimization
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Theorem: The DTM (UTM) heuristic results in at most twice the 
amount of data transfer (migrations) incurred by an optimal 
(NP-hard) algorithm.
Impact on TPC-W from migration
Migrating VM Migrating VM
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Non-Migrating VM Non-Migrating VM
CLOUDCOMMONS: Benefit to users
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Planet-Lab trace-driven experiments
(Overheads/costs of all XCS services included)
Talk overview: Two settings
Cloud resource acquisition 
? Colocation Games
A spatial packing game
Shared bandwidth arbitration
? Trade & Cap
l k
Resource Instances
L
o
a
d
d
June 22, 2010 Network and Cloud Resource Packing Games @ TU Berlin 32
A tempora  pac ing game
Time
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9Today’s last mile
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The perils of the fixed pricing model
? It’s here to stay; metered pricing rejected
? Implications:
? Customer has no incentive to save bandwidth
? ISP cost depends on peak demand – 95/5 rule 
? Reigning in bandwidth hogs is incompatible with 
Net Neutrality
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? Must devise mechanisms that take ISPs out 
of the “traffic shaping” business
DSLAM “last-mile” architecture
Broadband Remote
Access Server
DSL Access
Multiplexer
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Traffic shaping done at BRAS   
Solution: Create a marketplace
? Recognize the two types of user traffic:
? Interactive Traffic (IT)
? Browsing, VoIP, Video, Messaging, Gaming, …
? Limited bandwidth; highly sensitive to response time
? Fluid Traffic (FT)
? P2P, Network backup, Netflix/software downloads, … 
? Open-ended bandwidth; less sensitive to response time 
June 22, 2010 Network and Cloud Resource Packing Games @ TU Berlin 36
? Create a marketplace:
1. Give users rights to DSLAM bandwidth, and
2. Let users trade IT & FT allocations over time
10
The Marketplace
? Each user gets a fixed budget per epoch
? Budget proportional to level of service 
? An epoch is a fixed number of time-slots, 
e.g., 1 day = 288 5-min slots
? Trade & Cap
? User engages in a pure strategies game that 
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yields a schedule for its IT sessions
? User acquires as much FT bandwidth as its 
remaining budget would allow
Trading Phase: Strategy Space
? Session: 
An IT session is the sequence of slots during which an IT 
li ti  i  tiapp ca on s ac ve
? Slack: 
User may have flexibility in scheduling IT sessions; slack 
specifies the number of slots that an IT session is allowed to 
be shifted back/forth
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? Strategy Space:
The set of all possible arrangements of IT sessions within 
allowable slack define the strategy space for a user
Trading Phase: Cost Function
? Let xik be the bandwidth used in slot k by 
a chosen IT session schedule for user i.
? The cost incurred by user i  is given by:
∑ ∑∑
∈ ∈∈ ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⋅=
slotsk usersj
jkik
slotsk
kiki xxUxc
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? Cost of user i  depends on the choices 
made by other users – hence the game!
Trading Phase: Illustration
Cost(User 2) = 6
User 2 User 2
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User 1 User 1
Up 2 2 20 0 01 1
11
Trading Phase: Illustration
Cost(User 2) = 4
User 2 User 2
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User 1 User 1
Up 1 2 11 0 11 1
Trading Phase: Best Response
? BR of user i is the schedule of IT sessions 
that minimizes its cost ci 
? Computing BR is NP-hard, equivalent to 
solving a generalized knapsack problem
? Dynamic programming solution is 
pseudo-polynomial in the product of the 
number of sessions and number of slots
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? Scales well for all practical settings –
100s of users and 100s of slots 
Trading Phase: Findings
? Provably converges to Nash Equilibrium, 
even in presence of constraints
? For n users, Price of Anarchy is n, but in 
practice below 2, especially for n>10
? Experimentally, large reduction of peak 
utilization, even with small flexibility
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Capping Phase: Best Response
? BR of user i is to maximize total FT 
allocation
subject to the budget constraint
∑
∈
=
slotsk
iki ww
BU ⎟⎞⎜⎛∑ ∑
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slotsk usersj
jkpik cww −=⎟⎠⎜⎝
+⋅
∈ ∈
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Capping Phase: Budget
? Let V be an upper-bound on traffic per slot
? The ISP sets a target capacity C = V/R, 
where R ≥ 1 reflects its “resistance” to traffic 
? The ISP allocates C in some proportion 
(e.g., equally) to all users over all slots
? This constitutes the budget B assigned to a 
user over an epoch 
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T
n
CB ⋅=
Capping Phase: Findings
? Computing BR is efficient using Lagrange 
Multipliers method
? Provably, converges to a unique global 
(social) optimum that maximizes the FT 
allocations of all users
? Experimentally, smoothes the aggregate 
IT+FT traffic to any desirable level 
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controlled by resistance parameter R
Experimental Evaluation
Workload
Derived from WAN traces 
of MAWI project
? Identify users from volume 
and direction of flows to 
known ports (e.g., most 
traffic destined to port 80)
? Identify user IT sessions 
using thresholds on per-IP 
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traffic intensities over time
? Slack introduced using 
various models (e.g., fixed,  
proportional, etc.) 
Trading Phase: Experimental PoA
Over 5 slots Over 10 slots
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Theoretical PoA is n but not in practice
13
Trading Phase: Smoothing effect
Value proposition to ISPs
Max 
Slack
Reduction 
in 95% 
3 15%
6 24%
12 31%
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Trade & Cap: Flexibility pays off!
Value proposition to customers
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Trade & Cap
A win-win for ISPs and customers
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Trade & Cap: Implementation
? On Client Side (DSL Modem): 
+ Strategic agent to execute Trade & Cap
+ Operational service to classify and schedule
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? ISP Side (DSLAM or BRAS):
+ Support exchange between strategic agents
+ Enforce traffic/slot/user from Trade & Cap
14
Trade & Cap: Implementation
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Conclusion
? In many settings, resource management 
must be seen as a strategic game among 
peers or tenants of an infrastructure
? By setting up the right mechanism, one can 
ensure convergence and efficiency
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? New services are needed to support 
strategic and operational aspects of these 
game-theoretic mechanisms 
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